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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

GAYLAND, a Utah ·Corporation,
Respondent,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF
UTAH: LAMONT B. GUNDERSON, EDWIN Q. CANNON, SR.,
and WILLIAM G. LARSON, Individually and as members of the
Board of County ·Commissioners of
Salt Lake County,
Appellants.

Case No.
9280

BRIEF OF INTERVENERS
D. HOWE MOFFATT
ROBERT R. DANSIE
PAUL POTTER
JAMES P. ·COWLEY
\V. ARWICK C. LAMOREAUX
Attorneys for Interveners
STATEMENT OF THE ·CASE
This matter is before the court on appeal by Salt
Lake County from a judgment by the lower court reversing the determination of a zoning question by the Board
of County Commissioners.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

These interveners were requested by this court to
file a memorandum, at the time of the argument. We
desire this court to remand the matter to the trial court
so that the issues may be tried out fully, with all necessary parties before the court. On the other hand, if this
court chooses not to so remand, then the judgment of the
lower court should be reversed.
The interveners are the parties who appeared before
the County Commissioners and made a record at the
hearing against the issue of rezoning residential property, but were not advised of the lower court's review
of the matters heard and determined in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE F A·CTS
Gayland applied for a change of zoning on a tract
at 56th South at 13th East in Salt Lake County from
residential to commercial. The District Planning Com.
mission had opposed said application. The Salt Lake
County Planning Commission, after Gayland reduced
the size of the tract from 80 acres to 18, and then to 10
acres, recommended the change. (Ex. 1) As required
by the statute, the attempt by Gayland to amend the
district maps was at the legislative and administrative
discretion of the Board of County Commissioners; (1727-14 UCA 1953) and pursuant to law and notice, a public
hearing was had on November 4, 1959 at which fourteen
persons made statements opposing the proposal to amend.
An equal number appeared in favor. The transcript,
exhibit 3, is the record of proceedings. A large number
of maps and exhibits were introduced and used at the
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hearing, but for reasons not known to interveners, not
one of these maps was before the lower court, and is not
before this court for review.
Mr. Brockbank, president of Gayland-applicant,
n1ade a statement showing the general character of the
area as being residential, and under considerable development. (Tr. 6) He reviewed the traffic patterns manifest
by the maps showing the principal arterial highways
existent and projected on which there was no controversy.
He stated there were no shopping facilities in the area
and stated his desire to have the privilege of building
same at the above stated location, stating it was strategic.
He and others stated that 13th East was to be an "express-way", intended by the county, state road commission and other authorities to move traffic rapidly in and
out of the city and beyond the south boundaries of the
county. (Tr. 8, 10) He did not say how the commercial
facility he hoped to build would avoid traffic congestion
and a slowing down of automotive movement on that
important junction. l\lost of the witnesses against the
change made specific reference to those dangers and
pointed out that the overall importance of the expressway would be jeopardized and nullified if the historic
policy of the county were changed, and commercial
facilities allowed to come onto 13th East. The expressway planning had precluded any extension of commercial
zoning thereon. A witness said: "For these reasons,
you gentlemen have shown excellent judgment over the
years gone by in designating Thirteenth East as a noaccess traffic-carrying artery." (Tr. 32) Other competent witnesses referred to the folly of allowing com-
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mercial development along 13th East to defeat the longplanned purpose to move traffic rapidly there-along.
(Tr. 39, 45, 60)
It was disclosed by many witnesses that there already existed many separate tracts of commerciallyzoned land in the general area, aggregating in excess of
167 acres. (36, 42, 45, 47, 52, 56, 60, 63, 64, 67) The
opponents of the proposed change showed these areas
on the maps, now absent in the record, undertaking to
show the commission that there was excess commercial
zoning already existent. Pertinent to this important
question, a witness said: (Tr. 52)
"In the Murray area alone right now there
is considerable zoned property that is not being
used because the population has not grown sufficiently to develop that. It now stands as a blighted
area. People do not wish to build homes in the
zoned area and the business will not justify all
of the area at the present time being built upon."
An issue developed at the hearing as to the seriousness of intentions of the owners of the existing c.ommercially zoned land to proceed, to build shopping facilities
to serve the people of the area. Counsel for Gayland
chided: "What good will one hundred sixty acres or two
thousand zoned commercially do the people that want
to shop if there is nothing on there' I think it is material when these things are going up. They come in and
say that they have all this land zoned. What good is it
if there is nothing on it? ... " To which the chairman
responded: "I think it is material." (Tr. 69)

4:
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The witnesses had developed that one of the reasons
immediate development had lagged was that tenants,
commercially intending service units, were terrified,
frightened "with the confusion and· the zoning that comes
up, that is perpetually coming up." (Tr. 43, 44, 34, 35)
It was not the owners of the lands, but the potential
tenants, the grocers, druggists, clothiers, that were and
are still, uncertain. All of the land owners, including
the applicant, were and are in competition, unable to
make plans and commitments to service units that have
wanted to come into the central-county area. The record
makes it plain that the real problem was not the owners
of the lands, but the potential tenants, the service units
that were and are hoping for some "stability" of zoning
so that they may make decisions. As we will later
develop in our argument, this represented the central
problem, not the landowners. And the question before
the county commission for decision was whether to grant
additional commercial zoning before the existent tracts
went into development.
In a lively discussion between Gayland's counsel,
and the representative of extensive lands three-and-ahalf blocks to the west owned by Hi-Land Dairyman's
Association, it 'vas said: "I would like to say if Mr.
Rampton- had he asked Hi-Land if we will be building
next year, Hi-Land will do and build; we will so do.
We are going to build a very, very large shopping center." (Tr. 71) A current view of the tracts at 9th East
at 5600 South will show the honesty of these words.
Hi-Land is going ahead as planned, as are the Howe
5
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Brothers. But a real problem of "Stability" of zoning
existed, and still does.
The county commissioners by a two-to-one vote rejected the application, giving as reasons, as shown on
exhibit "1":
"There is sufficient commercial zoning in the
area; not warranted at this time."
That cleared the air.
Immediately following this decision, Gayland entered
the court asking alternative relief: that the entire zoning
ordinance of the county be declared void, or that the
court rezone the Gayland area. (R. 5) No notice
appeared to advise these vocal and interested opponents, whose identity and interest was well known to Gayland "on the record." Not one of them was made a party
to the serious but secret contest that followed.
The county defaulted. A belated attempt was made
to create the semblance of an issue for the lower court,
but the record before us, together with what follows
in this brief, will disclose that the interests of the public
were not preserved in this important area of determination. It was but five days before the petition for intervention was filed that any of the interveners learned of
the lower court action, and the imminence of argument
before this court. The only way interveners came to
lmowledge then was a publicized hearing on two additional applications for extension of commercial zoning
on 13th East just four blocks south of the Gayland
property. The interveners, intent on showing diligence
6
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in the protection of their lawful interests in respect to
the 62nd South applications, learned then that quietly,
and without notice, the 56th South denial by the county
Commission had been overturned. These interveners
acted immediately to enter this appeal.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered in the court below, not being predicated on evidence,
and contrary to the evidence and of law, require, compel
correction. Hence the application of these interveners,
who not alone demand a right to be heard on their own
account, but for the benefit of the public.
POINT
I. THE INTERVENERS HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT
TO INTERVENE.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE INTERVENERS HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT
TO INTERVENE.

The status of interveners in this case is governed
by Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, under the
following sub-sections :
(A) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon
timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action:
(1) when a statute confers an unconditional
right to intervene; or
(2) when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be
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inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound
by a judgment in the action; or
(3) when the applicant is so situated as to
be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property which is in the custody
or subject to the control or disposition of the
court or an officer thereof.
The interveners are clearly within all of the above
conditions. We shall discuss these conditions in relation
with intervener's position, in the order of the rule.
(A)

TIMELY APPLICATION:

In our Petition for Intervention, filed with this court
on the 8th day of December, 1960, it is stated:

"3. That the above-entitled action was commenced and went to judgment in the District
Court without any of the parties hereto being
made parties to said action, or being given any
notice whatsoever of the commencement or pendency of said action, and the parties hereto have,
within the past week, first learned of the aboveentitled action."
Interveners acted promptly, and in less than a week
after learning of the above action, the application and
petition to intervene was served and filed. In the case
of Leary v. United States, 224 U.S. 567; 32 Sup. Ct. 599,
it was declared by Justice Holmes that there is no presumption that a citizen has knowledge of a pending
action. The record is devoid of any evidence or shred
thereof that these interveners had any knowledge of
these proceedings thereof. That should dispose of the
question of timely application.
8
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(B) THE STATUTES OF UTAH CONFER
TWO UNCONDITIONAL RIGHTS TO INTERVENE:
This action was brought by plaintiff below under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, 78-33-1 et sec. The cause
of action not only sounds in declaratory relief, (R. 5,
Resp. Br. 3) but respondent Gayland, unsatisfied with
the result below on the alternative grounds, comes before
this court on "cross-appeal" from the refusal of the
court below to "declare the zoning resolutions invalid."
(Respondent's brief, p. 4, middle).
The Declaratory Judgments Act states in section 2
thereof that ''any person interested ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising
under the ... statute, ordinance ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder."
78-33-2
In 78-33-11, the parties required to be brought before
the court are stated:
''When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any
interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the proceedings .... "
Respondent cannot say that it was unaware of the
existence of these interveners and their vital interests.
Each and every one of them was present in person or
by counsel, at the public hearing before the Board of
County Commissioners, and gave his name, and in most
cases, hls address. Exhibit 3 is the brown transcript of
the said hearing, referred to and admitted on page 17

9
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of the record here and consists of 73 pages of testimony.
It is not numbered as an exhibit. On pages 2 and 3 of
said exhibit three the names of all of the interveners
appear in the index. Their respective statements appear.
It is assumed that plaintiff had the matter reported as
the commission does not ordinarily do such.
The basis of the vice of the plaintiff or the court
in failing to notify or join these interveners in the court
proceedings below may be found on page 1 of exhibit 3
wherein the schedule of "appearances" includes only
the name of the county planning director, and counsel
for the plaintiff, along with the names of the county
commissioners. Good reporting procedures would at
least include the names of counsel who formally appeared. These would include Grant Macfarlane and Warwick
C. Lamoreaux, both of whom spoke for parties in interest; and counsel for plaintiff-respondent was well aware
of their presence, as may be seen from their colloquy.
(Tr. 69, 71) Sufficient to repeat, none of the 14 parties
appearing agamst the applicant before the county commission were noticed nor joined as parties. 78-33-11
unequivocably says these parties "shall" be made parties.
Thus above appears the first of two statutory "unconditional rights to intervene" as required by Rule 24.
The second such unconditional right to intervene
is set forth in 17-27-23 UCA 1953. This section has reference to the rights of individuals to bring private
actions in case persons violate the zoning ordinance if
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they are not satisfied with enforcement by constituted
authority. The section specifically authorizes the requisite owners to . . .
'' ... institute injunction, mandamus, abatement or any other appropriate action or actions,
proceeding or proceedings to prevent, enjoin,
abate or remove such unlawful erection, construCtion, reconstruction, alteration, maintenance or
use."
Because of the abbreviated state of the record below,
of which these interveners were not a part, and could not
under the circumstances obviate, the trial record does
not disclose the exact 1ocation of intervener's lands,
homes and interests. Some of the interveners live within
the district and have lands immediately therein. Others
are located within 3 or more blocks of the respondent's
tract. Certainly under the provisions of 17-27-23 the
interveners thus have a second statutory status which
''confers an unconditional right to intervene." If we or
any of us may bring collateral proceedings in the use of
the extraordinary writs above enumerated, then we have
the right to intervene.
We will delay citing case authority until all of the
provisions of Rule 24 have been discussed. Our case
research brings excellent authority to light covering all
points of Rule 24.

(C) THE REPRESENTATION OF INTERVENER'S INTERESTS, BY THE EXISTING
PARTIES DEFENDANT WAS AND IS INADEQUATE.

11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

We are loathe to elaborate this matter for obvious
reasons, but intervener's statutory right under the rule
compels reference to the record of inadequacy. There
can be no doubt but that the county substantially defaulted below. Any reasons for such are not stated in the
record. At page 15 of the record, under the statement
of "appearances" the following text appears:
"For the plaintiff

Calvin Rampton

For the defendants
(Ollie McCulloch physically
present but not formally appearing."
Mr. Rampton proceeded to make his record, calling
Miss McNeal, Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners, who brought to court certain, but not all of the
proceedings and records, presented at the public hearing.
In identifying the first exhibit, the following appears at
page 16 of the record:

"Q. I offer Exhibit 1 in evidence.
THE COURT: Any objection, Mr. McCulloch? Or are you here?
~1:R.

McCULLOCH : I am officially not here,
your honor.
THE COURT: I see. Well, we will let the
record show that you are physically here.
Whether you are appearing or not is up to
you and the Exhibit will be received.
Three exhibits then came in without objection, whereupon the following appears:

''Q. Now, Miss McNeil, there were some additional Exhibits in the form of maps and so
forth?

12
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A.

Yes.

Q.

That you say have been taken back. I don't
know that they are material and so I won't
press the point of getting them in evid ence.... "

A reading of the transcript (exhibit 3) will show that
the maps became the basis of much of the testimony of
all parties. Brockbank predicted his testimony thereon,
(Tr 7) as did these interveners, as where one of counsel
pointed to one of them as being colored in purple, The
Hi-Land-Nielson tracts, Mr. Rampton specifically requesting opposing counsel to make the location clear.
The Hi-Land-Nielson tracts referred to on the maps, had
they been before the court below, and this court now,
would be seen to be but three blocks from the tract of
plaintiff-respondent. Of course the numerous "maps and
so forth" were and are highly material. They constitute
the basis upon which the county commissioners later rejected the application of plaintiff to zone additional commercial lands. It is clear in the record that those maps
proved that there was in excess of "one hunderd sixtyseven acres'' of land zoned commercially in the immediate
area under consideration, (Tr. 36) and a great deal more
close by. The burden of intervener's case before the
county commission was to this very point, by use of adequate and pertinent maps. (Tr. 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 40, 46,
47, 51, 5~ 53, 56, 57, 66)
It is to be deeply regreted that the trial court below
did not have access to those maps; for only with and by
reference to them, could the court attempt to understand

13
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the transcript, and approach the question under attack,
as well as see the many and varied locations of the several parcels of land zoned commerical in the area.
Under the point at present issue, we comment only
on the inadequacy of representation. The County Attorney did not represent the opponents on the record, nor
these interveners, when he did not call for, or make an
attempt, to produce those valuable, important and crucial maps. The trial court needed them. Its disposition
might have been altogether different had the proceeding
not turned into an ex-parte default committed in the dark,
without public notice, and without the official voice of
protest, objection, cross-examination for whatever it
might have been worth.
Nor is this the end :
Later, after the ex-parte record was made, and the
counsel of record were fighting in briefs, the subject of
"motives" came into focus, and is the subject of argument.
In its Findings of Fact, number 11 (a) the court
says:
"The denial was based wholly upon the premise that such a denial would protect an economic
advantage already obtained by owners of other
land zoned commercially in the general marketing
area in which the land in question is located." (R.
28)
It is interesting to search for the evidence to warrant
such a strange fmding. There are only two places to look:
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1. The reasons assigned by the commission in its official action are contained in exhibit 1 at the bottom
thereof:
''Basis of action: there is sufficient commercial zoning in the area; not warranted at this
time."
It is submitted that this is a good, sufficient and valid
reason for such action, based on the statutory powers
found in the general zoning laws of Utah. If counsel predicates his argument that ''the denial was based wholly"
upon this language, he is clearly in error. We believe that
no court would overturn a legislative body for giving such
a reason for its use of discretionary legislative power.
Counsel for appellant has adequately treated this subject.
2. The real but ephemeral basis for the above finding
by the lower court is the following leading question by
Mr. Rampton of Miss MeNeal:

"Q. Is it, or is it not, true that Commissioner Cannon said the reason that he was voting against
it was because of its impact on other commercial zones in the area 1". ...
"Q. Is that substantially what he

said~

A.

Substantially, yes." (R. 18,19)

Q.

I think that is all. .. " whereupon the record
closes.

Clearly this testimony was inadmissible: it was leading and suggestive. ·Counsel did not ask her to state what
was said. He phrased it to suit his purpose. By this time
he knew that the county attorneys present in body only

15
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would not object, and they did not! It should have also
been resisted for the reason of hearsay!
Had the matter been material and competent, and
the proceeding adversary in nature, the able counsel for
plaintiff would have called Mr. Cannon himself. But in
ex-parte fashion the inadmissible came in without objection; and to add insult to injury, the trial court predicated its fundamental finding on this patently inadmissible
shread! Fundamental Y-yes.
Sections one and two of respondent's brief are devoted to testing the question of jurisdiction of the lower
court to examine a proceeding before the county commission on claim of arbitrary abuse of discretion. Coming
there to the conclusion that the court has such visitorial
power, Point III of respondent's brief labors the question
of whether or not in fact the trial court was arbitrary,
and engaged in an abuse of sound discretion. The burden
of his argument is stated at page 16 of respondent's brief
as follows:
"Commisioner Cannon, when casting his vote,
and the other commissioners when putting down
the basis for their action, were frank to state that
their action was not based upon the things properly within the police power, but was based solely
upon the question of whether or not they felt additional zoning for commercial purposes would
have an adverse effect upon the lands already
zoned commercially.''
The court will realize that the above language is not a
proper summary, due to the natural bias of respondent's
counsel; but it clearly points up the importance of the
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irrelevant, incompetent, immaterial, hearsay, and leading
language that entered the record because the issue was
''inadequately represented," to return to the burden of
Rule 24. And it is upon this inadmissible testimony that
the lower court predicates its finding that the county
commission acted solely to ''protect an economic advantage already obtained by the owners of other land zoned
commercially in the general marketing area... " (R 28)
The county attorney should have done something about
this within the time allowed to alter Findings and Conclusions. Nothing was done to correct the record, nor to
even try. Again we say, it is clear the intervener's rights
were "inadequately represented" below.
Further, we call attention to the belated answer filed
by counsel for appellent:
1. In paragraph 6 of the complaint, respondent falsely alleges:
"There was no opposition at said hearing
from persons residing in the vicinity of the lands
in question. The only opposition came from the
owners of other comerical properties located at
various places from one-half to four miles distant
from the lands in question."
This allegation was never denied nor traversed in
the answer, and it should have been.
In paragraph 5 of the complaint, it is stated that "a
complete investigation and consideration of the matter"
was made by the planning commission. Complete is a
mighty big word to go unchallenged, at least from the
standpoint of 14 protestants who were in the dark as to

17
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these allegations. This should have been denied, and
plaintiff put to his proof by calling as witnesses those
who made such investigation. And orderly procedure
might suggest that such persons be subject to cross examination! Not even theoretically possible here.
Paragraph 9 of the complaint in sub-section (c), (d)
and (e) raise searching questions as to the manner in
which zoning has been carried on historically in Salt Lake
County. In view of the use of the word ''integrity" in
17-27-7.10 U.C.A. (supplement) as to zoning maps, and
the words "encouraging stability" as the objects of planning and zoning appearing in WOLPE v. PORETSKI,
144 F2d 505, hereafter to be discussed, it is enlightening
to find counsel for appellants did not traverse those important allegations. As the "inadequately" presented
answer stands, the county has admitted as to sub-section
(d) that "the zoning of the county has proceeded on a
piece-meal basis wi.thout legally established standards...
Zoning has been established and changed solely on the
basis of awarding or withholding economic benefits and
advantages to or from the owners of various tracts of
land desiring zoning according to their desires." (R 3)
We will repent of an earlier suggestion that the finding
of the court is not predicated on competent, admissible
evidence. In the state of this pleading, such was not even
necessary, when the county admitted by its virtual silence,
such allegation; but of course the county may not be defaulted in such a manner.
Rule 55( e) says:
"No judgment by default shall be entered
against the state of Utah or against an officer or
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agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to
the court. "
Affirmation by this court of the unproven Findings and
Conclusions, not based on evidence, and contrary to the
evidence and law, cannot be viewed by this court as ''satisfactory" and would become a woeful precedent.
Lastly, on this point, and out of caution, interveners
could have hoped that counsel would have included in its
answer a blanket denial of all matters not specifically
admitted, to the end that the burden of proof would truly
have lain on the party challenging the action. As it is,
and by the manner of "inadequate representation" the
burden has shifted to the wrong party; it now rests on
the county! Interveners feel they could aid the appellant,
as well as defend their own statutory right of representation and status on the record.
Again we refrain from citing authority until all of
the criteria under Rule 24 have been discussed as rules.

D. INTERVENERS WILL BE BOUND BY THE
JUDGMENT.
The second aspect of part (2) of rule 24 embraces
the showing, on application for intervention, that the applicant "is or may be bound by a judgment in the action."
Indeed, these interveners will be bound if this court determines the matter adverse to the appellant. The crux
of the issue if adversely decided, will be stare decisis,
and as stated in KOZAK v. WELLS, 8th CCA, 278 F2
104, 1960, it may well constitute an "adverse precendent
for the interveners."
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The novel position interveners face is this: if we are
not permitted to intervene, then under the Declatory
Judgements Act (78-33-11) we are not bound, for the statute expressly says that as to parties not joined that ''no
declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not
parties to the proceeding." This means that all or some
of the interveners may bring mandamus, injunction,
abatement or institute any other appropriate action in
the event Gayland hereafter applies for a building permit, or commences construction; this under 17-27-23.
CircuityT Multiplicity? But these interveners would
then be faced with the task of asking this court to reverse
itself, and declare contrary to what it might resolve in
the instant case. Certainly this court and the interveners
would all be put in a difficult position of preserving the
inviolate statutory rights of the interveners in the face
of a decision that would operate against them as stare
decisis. This problem will later be discussed under the
excellent cases of Kozak v. Wells, and W olpe v. Poretsky,
post, squarely in point.
E. THE INTERVENERS HAVE BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE JUDGMENT BE-

LOW:
Under subsection (3) of Rule 24 the third condition
precedent to intervention states that interveners must
show that they would ''be adversely affected" by the disposition of the property or subject-matter in question
below. Certainly these interveners will be injured, and
have been, by the unwarranted action of the trial court.
But in considering this aspect of the case, we desire this
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court to separate our argument into two parts : the interest of the interveners, as distinguished from the public
interest, the problem of serving the public in the area.
At the outset, let us examine the zoning statutes to
determine the statutory purpose of planning and zoning:
17-27-5 shows the ultimate scope of zoning power is aimed at the "harmonious development of the country" to
the end that there shall be such attention paid to the
"distribution of population and of the uses of land for
urbanization, trade, industry'' as will tend to create conditions favorable "to health, safety, transportation, prosperity ... tend to reduce wastes of physical, financial or
human resources which result from either excessive congestion or excessive scattering of population; and will
tend toward an efficient and economical utilization, conservation and production of the supply of food and
water," etc....
The inquiry of the county commission in this case
concerns the amount and location of commercial zoning
in respect to shopping centers, neighborhood and regional. Notice in the hearing transcript the county planner
Mr. Johnson, said, with the approval of the chairman of
the County Commission:
"Perhaps it will be well to mention at this
point any reference to a regioool shopping area
of ten acres is certainly not a shopping center."
(Tr 51)
Let it be kept in mind that two schools of thought
were at work at the hearing on the large question of
where commercial, shopping facilities would be located,
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to serve this fast-growing area. The president of plaintiff corporation stated:
''This shows that the whole middle section of
this area is an area that will be developed very
materially and has no shopping facilities in it
whatsoever, (indicating) (Tr. 11)
The issue the county commission had to decide was
whether to allow, in addition to the 167 acres already
zoned commercial (Tr. 36, 43) the 10 acres proposed by
Mr. Brockbank at the northwest intersection of 13th East
at 5600 South. (Tr. 11 bottom) He projected a future
population in the area to be served by commercial facilities of over 48,000 people. ( Tr. 13) But that remains for
the future. It was not, and is not yet, an actuallity. It
is the commission that must ultimately take into account
the ultimate needs of the area, in terms of its own appraisal and esimate of the growth and facilities that
should be available if and when that population comes
in. Mr. Brockbank wanted to get ready to serve this
influx of population. He wanted to serve them from his
ten acre tract. But to do so, he had the burden of convincing the county commission that his hazardous area was
better suited than the acreage already zoned commercial,
and which was and is in development by interveners and
others.
The other idea at work before the hearing, and which
question the commission had to decide, was whether
there should be one very large regional center, or several
small shopping centers. It is for this reason planner
Johnson stated the difference in the 10 acre tract from
the "regional shopping area" on page 51 of transcript.
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Interveners Hi-Land Dairyman's Association, together
with Nielson and Scott had near fifty acres under planning and develop1nent 3 and 1/2 blocks to the west of
plaintiff (Tr. 45, 40) and interveners Earl and John
Howe and near thirty acres just across 56th South from
the Hi-Land-Nielson property, (Tr. 33) making a total
of 80 acres, with serious intentions of going forward.
These lands were already zoned commercial.
Thus there was the real problem of whether there
should be a "regional" or several "neighborhood shopping" centers, or the chaos that would bring none!
If this court is to have any real understanding of
the large issue before the county commission then and
now, it must come to grips with the difference the county
planner noted above between the small 10 acre, neighboring shopping center, and the large 80 to 100 acre ''Regional Shopping Center" idea. A casual interest in the subject
will not reveal the immensity of the contrast, the philosophical considerations back of the planning, and the
financial risks attached to both.
That the large powers of city and county commissions exist to plan and zone is because of the blight that
historically grows in residential, commercial and industrial areas which do not reflect planning and zoning administration. The vast expendures of our times for such
activties, together with urban re-development compels
more than superficial considerations of specific applicants, litigants and land owners. It was and is to avoid
''substandardness and stagnation or deterioration" in
residential and commerical areas that zoning came into
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our society. The police powers of the state enter to avoid
these blights. The enormous powers of controlling "land
use" set forth in the statutes allowing zoning are intended
to substitute wise, advance planning for the historic exploitation by private interests alone.
The meaning of the decision of the Commission is
that the residential area, that is, the area roughly from
33rd South to the mountains east of State Street, one
vast partially developed residential area, has within it
sufficient area designated for commercial uses so that
the requirements of the people living in the area for the
services and facilities provided in commerical areas will
adequately and sufficiently satisfy their needs. It is basic
in zoning that in a residential area such as this it is the
welfare of the residents that is of primary concern to the
zoners and not the welfare of those in the commercial
area. In other words, the extension of the commercial
areas will be determined entirely by the demands of the
residential areas. The reason for this is that our experience has taught us that commerical areas are unfriendiy
neighbors and that blight tends to spread from the commercial areas, and if you are to protect your residential
areas the commerical areas must be tightly contained
and restricted so that there is not a surplus of such land
because it breeds unnecessary commercial uses and further expands the blight.
A 1959 casebook on the "Use, Misuse, and Re-Use of
Urban Land," edited by Chas. M. Haar, professor of law,
Harvard University, entitled "LAND-USE PLANNING"
opens this subject with vast illumination. As the very
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words used in the title are constantly used within the
Utah zoning statutes, this court ought to construe them
carefully. That case book, after printing the excellent decisions of the !Iassachusetts court on ''departures from
zoning ordinances" in PENDERGAST v. BOARD OF
APPEALS OF BARNSTABLE, 331 1\fass. 555, 120 NE
2d 916, and the Connecticutt court in KUEHNE v.
TOWN ·COUNCIL OF EAST HARTFORD, 136 Conn.
452, 72 A.2d 474, challenged the student mind with the
following ''problem" quotes from Stein and Bauer,
STORE BUILDINGS AND NEIGHBORHOOD SHOPPING CENTERS, 1, 2-3, 13-14 (1934: and the same appears at the page 282 of said case book:
''3. 'To plan a successful neighborhood shopping center, we must first know what to plan for,
how many stores, and what kind. Numerous painstaking surveys of existing conditions have been
made for the purpose of setting up a basis for
future planning. These have attempted to find the
number and kinds of stores that would be needed
by counting the number of existing stores or
measuring the number of front feet occupied by
existing stores and comparing that with the neighboring population. All these studies serve but one
purpose: they show us what not to do, for any
one who looks around his own neighborhood knows
that there are too many stores. And so we can
only use most of these analyses of existing conditions as a warning. They show why the great majority of shopkeepers make something less than
the barest living and die off like flies before they
even get started. They explain the long rows of
empty stores in every neighborhood. They explain
the enormous and expensive turnover in store
property. They explain decreased values, empty
lots, blighted streets and uncollected taxes ...
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"Chaotic waste in construction of stores, in
store operations and in cost of distribution, is not
a necessary and unavoidable condition. It is possible by scientific analysis of the problem and by
planned large scale construction and control to
set up shopping centers that will fulfill the requirements of the five interests concerned.
"Any approach to scientific store planning
must be based on one simple fact, namely, that
any given community has a fairly definite and ascertainable purchasing power, and the modifying
factors - income, general character, buying habits, location in relation to larger centers, etc. are quite capable of analysis and forecast...
"What is the use of developing a scientific
method of store planning~ None whatever, if
present methods of subdivision and chaotic development are allowed to continue. None whatever, unless the complete, planned neighborhood
is accepted as the minimum unit of development.
No scientific store-planning method can be applied
to speculative. method of development . ...
"Interesting cases reflecting the traffic-generating considerations are Temmink v. Board of
Zoning Appeals of Baltimore, 128 A2d, 256 ... "
other cases cited."
Plaintiff had in a real sense become a competitor
with these named interveners and others. He had tried
before the Planning Commission to get a full 80 acres
zoned commercial. Failing, he reduced its size to 18 acres.
Failing, he reduced it to ten acres. See exhibit "1 ", both
sides, together with action by the various authorities having jurisdiction. (See respondent's brief, p. 4.) Plaintiff
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failed to persuade anyone for a regional size center. In
the end, the planning commission recommended his smaller area, but the ultimate decision was solely under the
jurisdiction of the county co1nmission, not the planning
group. It 'vas at the public hearing on the 10 acre application that the problems and the solutions become evident. The county commission had for years held the respondent's land reserved only for residential. Because
of the express-way plans on 13th East, it had not allowed
any commercial development along that right-of-way.
(Tr. 32) It alone had the statutory authority to make any
changes, or give additional acreage for commercial useage. On the issue of abuse of discretion of that authority,
in refusing to zone the additional ten acres, along the 13th
East Expressway, let us examine the statutory mandate
clothing the county commission with legislative power to
make decisions :
Under 17-27-9: "The county planning commission may, ... and upon order of the board of
county comm~ssioners . . . shall make a zoning
plan or plans for zoning all or any pa;rt of the
unincorporated territory within such county ...
for the regulation by districts or zones of the location, heights, bulk, and size of buildings and
other structures, percentages of lot which may be
occupied, the size of lots, courts, and other open
spaces, the density and distribution of population,
the location and use of buildings and structures
for trade, industry, residence, recreation, public
activities or other purposes, and the uses of land
for trade, industry, recreation or other purposes."
The specification of the same powers, with regulations,
are repeated in 17-27-11 by amendment in the supplement,
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with no derogation. In 17-27-7.10 the powers of enforcement are stated to the end that ''integrity" shall be
maintained in the official maps of the county, of which
the zoning maps are a part.
Under 17-27-12 the board of county commissioners
is authorized to withhold a building permit in aid of these
powers.
Under 17-27-13 the county commission is ordered to
establish regulations in aid of upholding this authority,
to the end of
"lessening of congestion . . . reducing the waste
of excessive amounts of roads, securing safety
from fire and other dangers, providing adequate
light and air, classificati·on of land uses and distribution of land .development and utilization ...
fostering the state's agricultural and other industries, and the protection of both urban and nonurban development."
Clearly the county commission had the sole and exclusive
power to determine the location of commercial area and
whether they should be large, small, regional or neighborhood. And in these connections, it had knowledge of the
planning of other municipalities, the state road commission, the state planning commission. It also knew of the
existence of 167 variously located acres of prior commercially zoned areas in the vicinity of respondent's interest. How did that commission dispose of the question t
Was it arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of its legislative
discretion under the powers and duties of these statutes,
to find:
"There is sufficient commercial zoning in the
area; not warranted at this time"~
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Certainly not! Not only was it 'vi thin the po,ver; it was
the duty of the commission to act as it did. And no court
should substitute its judgment for that of the legislating
commission, in the absence of a clear abuse of that discretion. There was no abuse of discretion. This court in
MARSHALL vs. SALT LAKE CITY, 141 P2d 704, 149
ALR 282 wisely held:
"It is primarily the duty of the city to make
the classifications. If a classification is reasonably
doubtful, the judgment of the court will not be
substituted for the judgment of the city ...
"As to what restrictions and limitations
should be imposed upon property, and what uses
thereof should be permitted, has been by the legislature, committed to the judgment and discretion
of the governing body of the city. As long as that
body stays within the grant, and purposes fixed
by the legislature, the courts will not gainsay its
judgment. (cases) No one would doubt that the
exercise of the zoning power is definitely a legislative function and activity."
That interveners are the incidental beneficiaries of the
use of such discretion is immaterial, so long as the result
in tenns of public policy and administration is within the
police power and scope of the statutory enactment. The
commission had to decide the vexing question before it,
and it was and is under no mandate to use "magic words"
in the disposition. Had exhibit "1" simply said "no'' as
the record of its action, it would be difficult to challenge,
based on the record made at the public hearing. But its
reasons were good and valid. Everything pointed in the
record to 13th East being an expressway, expensively
29
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designed to move traffic rapidly. To put a 10 acre Commercial area thereon would or might violate the statutory
mandate against "waste of excessive amounts of roads"
in 17-27-11. A commercial use at these important crossroads might be found to increase congestion. "To prevent heavy traffic from going through a residential area"
is an expression to which zoning authority is constantly
on guard. The consequences of allowing such is the subject of much reference in the text: "URBAN REDEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND PRACTI·CES" at
page 6 in the note. See the warning of a witness at the
hearing at page 60 of the hearing transcript. The courts
presume that legislative bodies like county commissions
regularly pursue their authority; they do not presume,
as was done here, the abuse. The trial court is to be excused for substituting its judgment for that of the county
commission because of the default referred to above, and
the contracted record before it; but it must be reversed
ultimately on the merits.
Certainly interveners have been "adversely affected"
by the substitution of the trial court's judgment over the
regularly constituted Salt Lake County Commission. It
begs the question for respondent's counsel to labor our
position as that of simple competitors. We are citizens,
with rights to challenge, but never to subvert. We appeared before the hearing, presented our rights under notice,
made our positions lrnown on this difficult legislative
question. Our position was never presented as mere comp·etitors; the commission honored our presentations with
their confidence, as shown by the vote.
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The real question was not favoritism, nor the protection of any vested interest. Respondent's counsel well
puts it on page 12 of its brief:
"If an economic advantage is conveyed upon
the owner of land by coincident in the course of
the exercising of the police power for the protection of the public health, safety, moral or welfare,
such a conferring of economic advantage does not
invalidate the zoning regulation."
As he quotes in LIEB'S APPEAL, 116 Atl (2) 860: "This
is a by-product of zoning."
The County commission concluded by apt words
that the public interest would not warrant additional commercial zoning. It announced in the press its disposition
as shown on exhibit" 1". All of the interveners, ignorant
of any appellate procedures, have gone to work in reliance on that decision. Tenants have signed leases with
these interveners; ground has already been broken on the
80 acres north and south of 5600 south at 9th East in preparation for a giant regional center. Architectural plans
have been bid upon by contractors looking for spring construction, only to now find that in the quiet that the certainty achieved by the county commission has been overruled and that Gayland has, virtually as a secret, reintroduced the frightening nightmare of uncertainty and
chaos.
Indeed these interveners have been "adversely affected" as has the public interest. The fields that have
been leveled and filled, the water-courses that have been
moved to make way for millions of dollars of construction, must be abandoned. Contracts with builders, tenants
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and the host of service personnel connected with these
projects have been seriously jeojardized during the week
in November that this appeal brought our first knowledge
that stare decisis was unfixed. Competitive interests T
It has always been thought that our economy in all of its
greatness was bottomed thereon, subject to proper regulation in the public interest. But even with the competition existent between Mr. Brockbank and the interveners, the public interest is still paramount. And the Board
of ·County Commissioners of Salt Lake is still charged
with the fundamental responsibility and legislative authority to decide where, how and when commercial land
shall be made available to serve the growing population
in Salt Lake Valley. It made that decision after a wellfought public hearing, and after five months of careful
reflection. There is evidence to uphold the judgment of
that commission. No court should ever up-root such a
legislative body in such an important and far-reaching
decision, and above all, in a default situation where so
many interest were unrepresented, and unaware! Indeed,
interveners as well as the public have been seriously injured.
THE ·CASES
In WOLPE v. PORETSKY, 144 F2d, 1944, 505 the
U. S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, reviewed a case from below virtually "on all fours"
with the one at bar. The decision articulates the issue of
the right to intervene under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules,
identical with Utah's. The zoning statutes were of the
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same compass. The decision is dispositive of the case at
bar. Certiorari was denied by the U. S. Supreme Court,
65 Sup.Ct. 190. 1t has been followed in the 8th Circuit,
post.
The plaintiff there, being denied by the local zoning
ordinances and authority, the right to build an apartment
house on residentially zoned land, entered the district
court claiming the ordinance and refusal to rezone were
illegal, arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.
The trial court found such was the case, and ordered the
zoning authority to amend its code and allow him to
build an apartment. The zoning authority immediately
complied, deciding not to appeal, and changed the ordinance classification.
Interveners there filed an application to enter the
case, after judgment, asking in the alternative for a new
trial, or the status to appeal, both being denied, the court
stating the interveners had nothing that could cause it to
change its mind.
On appeal, the entire proceedings were reviewed and
reversed. All of the elements treated above by this brief
in sub-sections (a) to (e) are well discussed by the unanimous court.
The court adverts to the basic zoning law of the District of Columbia, stating that one of its objectives is
"encouraging stability of districts and of land values
therein." The Utah statute uses the word "integrity"
among many others, at 17-27-7.10. The testimony of
Carpenter and Webber at pages 31 and 42 of the tran-
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script shows the importance ofstability, ~ntegrity, in the
field of uncertainty, confusion. The court said:
"The interest of individual property owners
in protecting the stability of districts and of land
values therein is expressly recognized by Sect. 5422 of the ~Code. That section puts neighboring
property owners, specially damaged by the violation of a zoning order, on an equal footing with the
Corporation Counsel in the enforcement of that
order. They are given the direct right to enjoin the
unlawful construction of a building. Their right
to bring that independent action is the basis of
appellants' right to intervene in this case."
Apposite to this is 17-27-23 UCA 1953, discussed at
page 11 of this brief.
The court further said:
"It seems clear that a judgment which declares a zoning order to be void would bind adjoining property owners to the extent of taking
away their statutory right to an independent aetion based on the order. Otherwise, adjoining
property owners could relitigate the issues in the
case any time the plaintiff began construction, on
the theory that their right to bring an independent action was not concluded by the decree. The
practical result of such an interpretation would
be to compel any one bringing a suit like the present one to join all property owners 'vho n1ay conceivably be damaged. We believe that the Zoning
Commission, in the absence of intervention by adjoining property owners sufficiently represents
their interests so that a decree setting aside a zoning order may bind them.
"It follows from Rule 24 (a) that appellants
may intervene as of right in the case provided (1)
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that the representation of their interests by the
Zoning Commission is or may be inadequate, and
( 2) that the application is timely. Both of the
above requirements appear in this case. The failure of the Zoning Commission to take an appeal
clearly indicates that its representation of the interests of the interveners was inadequate. We do
not go so far as to hold that adequate representation requires an appeal in every case. But here
an administrative body is charged with arbitrary
and capricious action in the face of a strong presumption that they properly performed their duties. Some of the reasons relied on by the court
in declaring the zoning order void are more pertinent as arguments to influence the judgment of
the Commission in balancing the various considerations laid down by the act than they are to support a ruling that the commision's order was arbitrary and capricious. It is not the function of the
courts to substitute its judgment for that of the
Commission even for reasons which appear most
persuasive. A suit to declare a zoning order void
is not an appeal on the merits of the issue presented to the Commission at the hearing. We do not
pass on the merits of the court's findings or decree because the evidence is not before us. We only
indicate that there is enough in the record to show
that in refusing to take an appeal the ·Commission
did not adequately represent the interests of interveners."
"The application to intervene was timely. Intervention may be allowed after a final decree
where it is necessary to preserve some right which
cannot otherwise be protected. Here, at least one
of the rights which cannot be protected without intervention is the right of appeal. The court was,
therefore, in error in denying appellants leave to
~ntervene as a matter of right.
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"In their motion to intervene appellants rely
solely on Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which relates to permissive intervention. However, had the intervention been
permissive we think it would have been an abuse
of discretion to deny it under the curcumstances
of this case. Adjoining property owners in a suit
to vacate a zoning order have such a vital interest
in the result of that suit that they should be granted permission to intervene as a matter of course
unless compelling reasons against such intervention are shown. (cases)
"When they filed their petition for intervention appellants had all the rights of a party at that
stage of the proceedings. This, of course, includes
the right of appeal. Since thetime for appeal had
not expired when appellant sought to intervene
they should be made parties with the right to appeal and all other rights a party might exercise at
the time their intervention was filed. Reversed
and remanded.''
When the highest court of the land refused to disturb the W olpe case, and the rules, statutes and facts are
so similar, it ought to set the precendent for disposition
here!
The W olpe case has been twice cited, importantly in
KOZAK v. WELLS, 278 F.2d 104 by the 8th CCA in 1960.
Intervention was there allowed one year after filing by
plaintiff. Inadequacy of representation was ''""ell discussed, as is the binding effect required of intervener under
Rule 24. The Court said:
" ... we think that in a very real sense the
applicants-interveners, would be bound .. and the
result would certainly establish an adve,rse precBdent for the interveners."
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The case also articulates principles of '~liberality
toward third party practice" that are important here.
Emphasis is given to the words in Rule 2~ "may be:"
'~And

if the case is close and there are any
doubts, the 'may-be' language twice repeated in
Rule 24 (a) (2) convinces us that they are to be
resolved in favor of the interveners."
TI~IEL Y

INTERVENTION: The facts show these
interveners acted promptly, once they came to knowledge
of the action in the courts. The general subject of when
intervention may be had is discussed in 67 CJS 997 under
which we find SENNE v. CONLEY~ 133 P2d 381 helpful.
The broad rule is stated in CJS supra :
"Where there is no statutory provision as to
the time within which application to intervene
shall be made, a person who makes his application
at the earliest possible opportunity has been held
to have made it in time ... "
In LEARY v. UNITED STATES, 224 U. S. 567, 32
Sup. Ct. 599, Mr. Justice Holmes writes, concerning intervention after four years lapse:
''As to laches, there is no legal presumption
that the petitioner knew of this suit and still less
that she knew the position taken by Kellog... "
and the court allowed intervention.
The first Utah case is Houston Real Estate vs. Hechler, Utah, 1914, 138 P. 1159, in which plaintiff issued a
writ of attachment and levied upon property purporting
to be defendant's. The Intervener was denied the right
to intervene for the purpose of establishing his ownership
of property. The Court laid down the following rule:
37
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"As we understand the purpose of the statute
relating to intervention, it is not intended to be
applied only where a third person may have such
an interest in the subject of the action which
makes him an indispensable party; but the statute
applies where such third person at some stage of
the proceedings before trial is shown to have an
interest which would make him a proper party."
This case was followed in Dayton vs. Free, Utah
1916, 162 P. 614, where the 'Court quoted with approval
from Coffey v. Greenfield as follows:
''And the Code does not attempt to specify
what or how great that interest shall be, in order
to give a right to intervene. Any interest is suffici'e.nt. The fact that the intervener may or may
not protect that interest in some other way is not
material. If he has an inter·est in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties,
he has a right to intervene."
In the same case the ·Court quoted with approval from
Pomeroy's Code Remedies as follows:
"The doctrine may be expressed in the following manner: The intervener's interest must be
such, that if the original action had never been
commenced, and he had first brought it as the sole
plaintiff, he would have been entitled to recover
in his own name to the extent at least of a part of
the relief sought."
The court in 1934 in the case of Commercial Block
Realty vs. U.S.F. & G. 28 P. 2d 1081 allo,Yed intervention
and quoted the rule as follows:
"Before one can intervene, he must come within the provision of the statute. He must have an
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interest in the matter in litigation, in the success
of either of the parties, or an inter.est against both.
He can join with the plaintiff in claiming what is
sottght by the complvant, or he can unite with the
defendant in resisiting the claim of the plaintiff,
or he can demand anything adversely to both the
plaintiff and the defendant. But before he can
do any of these, he must have an interest in the
matter which is in litigation. His right to intervene is wholly dependent upon his interest in the
subject-matter of the litigation. The test usually
applied to the right to intervene is whether a person seeking to intervene may gain or lose by a
direct legal oper,ation and the effect of the j~tdg
ment. Faricy v. St. Paul Investment & Sav. Society, 110 Minn. 311, 125 N.W. 676; Henry v. Travelers' Insurance Co., supra. Do the allegations in
the answer in intervention bring appellant within
this class?

In one case the question of the right to intervention
in a mandamus action arose, State vs. Blake 1933, 20 P.
2d 871, where intervention was allowed, and in this matter
quoted the rule as follows:
"It is equally well established that a permanent writ of mandate will not issue when the rights
of a third party, who is not before the court, are
involved and where such rights may be adversely
affected.''
The court in its most recent case, Stone vs. Salt Lake
City, 356 P. 2d 631, stated that it would be proper for the
Court to allow intervention by parties whose interest was
identical with that of plaintiff after the Court had remanded the case to the District ~Court following the appeal.
39
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IN SUMMARY, interveners say without hesitation,
that the conditions precedent in Rule 24 (a) are fully and
conapletely met:

a. Our application was timely, immediately upon
learning of the action.
b. We have to statutory, unconditional rights to intervene.
c. The representation of the intervener's interest,
and that of the public, was inadequate.

d. The interveners will be bound by the judgment,
not technically in res adjudicata, but actually by stare
decisus ; the net effect of a decision affirming the trial
court will amount to their being bound.
e. Interveners have been adversely affected.
We submit that interveners should and must be allowed intervention as of right under Rule 24 (a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A careful reading of this court's decision in MARSHALL v. SALT LAKE CITY, 141 P2, 704 will aid in
the application of established law to the problems of review in this case.
We respectfully request this court to read:
TIMMINK v. BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS
128 A2d 256, 1957~ Maryland
KUEHNE v. TOWN, EAST HARTFORD
72 A2d 474, ~Conn. 1950
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PENDERGAST v. BD. OF APPLS. BARNSTABLE
120 N.E.2d 916, 1954 Mass.
CONCLUSION
Interveners regret the length of this brief; but we
have tried to demonstrate that the effect of this court's
decision can be far-reaching for evil or for good, in preserving the "integrity'' of planning, and in the avoidance
of blights that snuff out the lights of residents who seek
the green and spacious country-side, away from the incidence of commerce.
If our new open residential areas are to be quarantined from blight, screened-off from death-dealing traffic, removed from the contagion of commerce, isolated
from congestion, then the courts that set precedent for
the occupancy of the powers of land-use and land-management must be alert to their larger prerogative in
guarding the gardens of men's homes against incipient
encroachment of the specifics that spawn blight.
This case offers such an opportunity.
Respectfully,
D. Howe Moffat
Robert R. Dansie
Paul Potter
James P. Cowley
Warwick C, Lamoreaux
Attorneys for Interveners
December 1960
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APPENDIX
In a larger sense, a statement of the case should embrace the philosophical suggestion that courts, the Salt
Lake County Commission, counsel on all sides, are manipulators in the current exodus from worn-out, decadent
cities and into the country. Whether we have the capacity
to admit it or not, a vast evolutionary remaking of urban
life is here at work. It is said by men wiser than the
interveners:
''New Towns are essential. This is because
the existing cities cannot fit the needs of this age
without a complete rebuilding ... one must begin
with a clean slate and a large one . . . the sane
policy is first to direct our energy toward building
new and complete communities from the ground
up: that is to say on open land outside developed
urban areas. This we should do until such time
as we have adequately demonstrated, by contrast,
how unworkable and wasteful are the obsolete
patterns of the old cities, and how completely they
demand replacement. It is futile to attempt this
in a small piece1neal manner."
If we in this case approach the problems at bar with the
old spectacles, we will be re1nembered only for our folly.
Whether we know it or not, the redevelopment evolution,
the "survivial value" rudiments are at work in the open
fields and vacant lands of the Great Salt Lake 'Talley,
where the litigants and interveners bring to focus the
privileges for growth or sterility to those spacious acres
in terms of the lives of citizens, children, and corporations!
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STEIN, in his TOWARD NEW TOWNS FOR
AMERICA, 218-226, (Rev. ed. 1957) said the above, and
challenges with the following criteria against which we
all act in the case at bar :
~'The

strained nerves, tension, physical disabilities, declining birthrate, breakdown, and madness resulting from 'normal' urban life. Death at
every street crossing perpetually haunting parents. Sunless, insanitary, filthy, congested slums
spreading blight throughout the towns ...
"Buses and subways are packed tight with
human indignity; 100 m.p.h. machines crawl snaillike as traffic is congealed ... Life and movement
is imprisoned by gridiron streets forming an archaic pattern within which houses, factories,
shops, and offices are crammed. Sunlight and
breezes are blocked; privacy and effective working conditions are lacking . . . Man is submerged
in the colossal, human swarm, his individuality
overwhelmed . . . In the canyons of the city nature
is obliterated by the hard masonry. Man is lost
in the stony urban desert . . . In the city people
are always going somewhere instead of doing
things ... The growing costliness of great cities
absorbs an ever-larger share of the incomes of individuals and municipalities ...
"The grave faults of the obsolete urban environment inevitably lead one to seek physical
patterns more in harmony with present-day culture. The developments described in the preceding
chapters have been proving grounds, and partial
demonstartions of the evolving forms of the future, in which -B-
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SAFETY will take the place of danger when
pedestrian and automobile traffic are entirely
separated by the use of properly designed superblocks and specialized means of circulation
throughout our cities. SPACIOUSNESS will banish congestion... THE NEIGHBORHOOD, which
will have a limited area and a central meeting
place, will provide a setting for friendship and
co-operative participation in common activties ...
ECONOMY of money, time, and energy ... will
come from ... efficient planning for use, in place
of speculative sale... In the distribution of industry in relation to living quarters we have made
little progress.
"New Towns mean new plans and different
physical arrangements, with green belts and inner-block parks, neighborhoods and superblocks,
community centers, and the separation of roads
and walks. These modern urban forms are bound
to replace the obsolete, socially repellent, barren
real-estate gamblers' checkerboard. ..
"A new technique is required... It requires
another kind of legislative background and different ownership or control - at least control of
land if not of building ...
The OBJECTIVE of New Towns is fundamentally social rather than commercial. Bluntly,
the distinction is that between building for people
or building for profit..."
That the above quotations are pertinent, and within
the statement of this case, should be apparent from their
inclusion in the 1959 La'v School Case Book LAND-lTSE
PLANNING by Charles l\I. Haar, professor of Law at
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Harvard University. (page 56). Indeed, the facts before
this court evolve from the current buliding of what must
be termed ne"" cities within Salt Lake County. The impact of locating shopping facilities within or near-by vast
n~w housing districts is the compass this court uses.
Whether it is cognizant of the amplitude of its decision
in terms of contemporary concepts of the new planning,
or whether it makes resort to the old norms we do not
know. Interveners try here to elaborate the problem in
the larger ambit of what is good for people, not individual self-interest. That the owners of commerical property
may benefit by the legislative determination of the location of shopping facilities, in relation to where people
live, must be ancillary, never primary.
In elaborating our self-interest, we yet challenge the
court to view the problem for what it is. We are all a
part of the current exodus. In the not-too-distant-future,
Salt Lake Valley will be filled in with growth. Shall it
take the form of planning, on high-principles of the general welfare, or shall predatory interest, intent on the
quick profit, retain the assendency?
This is the question.

-D-
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